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I. THE SYMPOSIUM
On November 18, 1994, the Seattle University School of Law and
the Seattle University Law Review proudly sponsored A Symposium on
the Legal, Medical, Ethical, and Societal Issues Surrounding Physician-
Assisted Death. This Symposium was notable not only for its timely
subject matter, but also because it was the first of our annual symposia
to be held under the auspices of our new parent institution, Seattle
University. From the earliest planning stages, the Seattle University
administration and academic community exhibited remarkable support
and enthusiasm for this endeavor. The Symposium and this issue thus
mark the beginning of what promises to be a long and mutually
beneficial collaboration between the law school and Seattle University.
In the context of our affiliation with a Jesuit institution, the
question of whether we as a society should countenance physician-
assisted death1 for the terminally ill presented an ideal subject for in-
depth discussion, raising as it does complex questions that implicate
the overlapping spheres of law, medicine, philosophy, ethics, and
religion. Furthermore, the law school setting for the Symposium
seemed particularly appropriate given that the societal debate over
physician-assisted death appears destined to be played out increasingly
within a legal framework. A brief survey of this legal landscape will
* Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law; M.D. 1985, University of
Washington School of Medicine; J.D. 1989, University of Puget Sound School of Law (now
Seattle University School of Law).
1. I intend the term "physician-assisted death" to encompass those situations in which a
physician writes a prescription for a lethal dose of medication with knowledge that the individual
intends to take his or her own life (often referred to as "physician-assisted suicide"), and those
situations, such as lethal injection, in which the physician both provides the means and performs
the final act that causes the individual's death (often referred to as "voluntary euthanasia").
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both illustrate the extent to which the law has taken the leading edge
on this question and provide a useful introduction to the Symposium
Issue.
Over the past several years, advocates have tried a number of
approaches to the legalization of physician-assisted death. Their early
attempts centered on state legislatures, where they sought legislation
that would allow the terminally ill to seek help from physicians to end
their own lives. As these efforts failed to produce results, advocates
next turned to state initiative and referendum processes in which the
question could be taken directly to the voters. In 1991, the citizens of
Washington were asked to vote on Initiative 119, which would have
legalized physician "aid-in-dying" for the terminally ill.2 After a
hard-fought battle that largely centered on whether the proposed
statute had sufficient safeguards to protect against abuse, the voters in
Washington defeated the initiative by a margin of fifty-four percent
opposed to forty-six percent in favor.3 Similarly, in 1992, voters in
California rejected Proposition 161,' which would also have legalized
"aid-in-dying," albeit with additional safeguards.'
Faced with defeats in Washington and California, various
proponents of physician-assisted death hit upon an alternative and
potentially more powerful approach to achieve their goal of legalized
physician-assisted death for the terminally ill. Rather than relying on
the limited and expensive state-by-state initiative processes, they began
to raise federal constitutional challenges to state statutes that prohibit
and criminalize assisted suicide.'
In fact, the genesis for this Symposium is a case in which just
such a challenge was made. In Compassion in Dying v. Washington,7
the plaintiff physicians and terminally ill individuals challenged the
constitutionality of Washington's statute that makes assisting a suicide
a criminal offense.8 On May 3, 1994, a federal district court judge in
2. See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF WASHINGTON, VOTERS
PAMPHLET 27 (Ed. No. 1, 1991).
3. See Results, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 6,1991, at D6.
4. See Virginia Ellis, California Elections, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at A3.
5. See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA
BALLOT PAMPHLET 68 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(holding Washington's statute criminalizing assisted suicide to be unconstitutional), rev'd, 49 F.3d
586 (9th Cir. 1995); Quill v. Koppel, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (rejecting a federal
constitutional challenge to New York's assisted suicide statute); Michigan v. Kevorkian, 527
N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994) (rejecting a federal constitutional challenge to Michigan's temporary
ban on assisted suicide), cert. denied sub norm., Hobbins v. Kelley, 131 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1995).
7. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
8. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (1994).
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Seattle struck down the statute, holding that it unconstitutionally
burdened the Fourteenth Amendment rights of terminally-ill,
competent individuals who wish to commit physician-assisted suicide.9
Clearly this case, if upheld by the Ninth Circuit, had the potential to
radically alter the legal landscape of physician-assisted death.1" Even
more important, litigants on both sides are determined to bring this
issue before the United States Supreme Court. If the Court should in
the future hold that states cannot constitutionally prohibit physician-
assisted death for the terminally ill, then every state will be required
to allow physician-assisted death in one form or another.
While the Compassion in Dying case was thus the spark for our
Symposium, an equally important event occurred just days before we
convened. On November 8, 1994, the citizens of Oregon through their
initiative process approved The Oregon Death With Dignity Act.1
With this Act, Oregon became the first place in the world to legalize
physician-assisted suicide. 2 The statute, which is presently enjoined
pending a decision on its constitutionality, 3 allows a terminally-ill,
competent individual to make a written request to a physician for
medication with which to end his or her life. 4
This, then, was the fortuitous timing of our Symposium: a few
days after our neighboring state of Oregon had legalized physician-
assisted death and a few days before the appellate oral argument to the
Ninth Circuit in the Compassion in Dying case.
As reflected in the Symposium title, our intent was to generate a
far-reaching interdisciplinary discussion on the issue. To this end, our
panels were made up of a mix of academicians, practicing attorneys
9. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
10. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals eventually reversed the district court's decision.
See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995); see also infra text
accompanying notes 36-39.
11. Mark O'Keefe, Assisted-Suicide Measure Survives Heavy Opposition, OREGONIAN, Nov.
10, 1994, at Al.
12. See The Oregon Death With Dignity Act (1994), reprinted in Kane v. Kulongoski, 871
P.2d 993, 1001-06 (Or. 1994). Prior to the passage of Oregon's statute, the Netherlands had the
least restrictive euthanasia policy in the world. Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are
technically illegal in the Netherlands, but specific rules, approved by the Dutch Parliament in
1993, protect physicians from prosecution if certain conditions are met. See Marlise Simons,
Dutch Move to Enact Law Making Euthanasia Easier, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1993, at Al. In order
to avoid prosecution in the Netherlands, a physician must be able to show that the patient had
no hope of recovery, was experiencing unbearable suffering, was competent and voluntarily
requesting to die explicitly and repeatedly, and that another physician saw the patient and
supported the decision. Id.
13. See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994); see also Oregon's Assisted-Suicide
Law is Blocked Pending Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1994, at A9.
14. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, supra note 12, § 2.01.
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and physicians, philosophers, ethicists and clergy, and advocates drawn
from the community.
The first panel explored in detail the case of Compassion in
Dying."5 The attorneys for the plaintiffs and for the State of Wash-
ington began by outlining their positions on the constitutionality of
Washington's statute criminalizing assisted suicide. Professor Kenneth
R. Wing, an expert in constitutional law, followed with an insightful
critique of their constitutional arguments and some thoughts about how
the sitting justices on the United States Supreme Court might analyze
this question. The next panel moved from the constitutional to the
more directly political realm, with each of the panelists representing a
community organization within Washington that has taken a strong
position on physician-assisted death. 6
Following a spirited keynote speech and an equally lively question
and answer period, 7 the first afternoon panel took up the issue of
physician-assisted death from the perspective of health care providers
who regularly care for dying individuals." Finally, the afternoon
concluded with an examination by philosophers and ethicists of the
moral and ethical implications of physician-assisted death. 9 The
Symposium Issue is largely comprised of articles by members of these
panels, and thus reflects the thought-provoking interchange between
speakers and audience that characterized this Symposium.
15. The following individuals participated on this panel: Kenneth R. Wing, Professor of
Law at the Seattle University School of Law and the University of Washington School of Public
Health; Kathryn L. Tucker, senior associate in the law firm of Perkins Coie; and William L.
Williams, Chief of the Health Division of the Washington State Attorney General's Office.
16. The following individuals participated on the second panel: Susan Dunshee, President
of the Board of Compassion in Dying; Sister Sharon Park, Associate Director and Lobbyist for
the Washington State Catholic Conference; Todd Maybrown, partner in the law firm of Allen,
Hansen & Maybrown; and Jerry Sheehan, Legislative Director of the American Civil Liberties
Union of Washington.
17. The keynote speaker was Giles R. Scofield, Associate Professor of Law at the Pace
University School of Law, and Assistant Clinical Professor of Social Medicine & Epidemiology
at Albert Einstein College of Medicine of Yeshiva University, Montefiore Medical Center.
Professor Scofield's speech is reprinted in this issue.
18. The following individuals participated on this panel: Thomas Preston, M.D., Professor
of Medicine at the University of Washington School of Medicine and cardiologist at Pacific
Medical Center; Suzanne Johnson, attorney in private practice in Seattle, Washington; Peter M.
McGough, M.D., President of the Washington State Medical Association; Peter Shalit, M.D.,
primary care physician in Seattle, Washington; and Donald E. Spencer, President of the
Washington State Hospice Organization.
19. The following individuals participated on this panel: Albert R. Jonsen, Professor &
Chairman, Department of Medical History & Ethics at the University of Washington School of
Medicine; Paul T. Menzel, Provost and Professor of Philosophy at Pacific Lutheran University;
and Father Robert J. Spitzer, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Seattle University.
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II. THE SYMPOSIUM ISSUE
Professor Albert Jonsen leads off the Symposium Issue, using the
events surrounding Initiative 119 and its aftermath in Washington as
well as the recent events in Oregon to illustrate the nature of the
modem "euthanasia" discourse.20 He characterizes the current debate
as one over the appropriate boundaries of individual autonomy in
decision-making, with proponents of physician-assisted death arguing
for an expansive view of individual autonomy and opponents contend-
ing that we must limit autonomy in order to protect the weak and
vulnerable in our society from coerced or involuntary death.21
Having begun with the modern debate, Professor Jonsen then
provides a historical perspective in which he examines the evolution in
both terminology (from "mercy killing" and "euthanasia" to "assisted
suicide") and theoretical underpinnings for physician-assisted death.
Thus, we are reminded that the earliest justification for physician-
assisted death was the principle of beneficence-the physician's
obligation to relieve pain and suffering.22 It is only in recent times,
as an outgrowth of our willingness as a society to recognize individuals'
rights to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, that we have come
to ground physician-assisted death in notions of liberty and autonomy.
Professor Jonsen explains that we have moved away from the classical
philosophical arguments, which tended to speak in terms of whether
euthanasia was "right" or "wrong," toward a more pragmatic and
consequentialist analysis that asks whether we can achieve a balance
that both effectuates the autonomy of those individuals who desire
assisted death and protects those individuals who do not.23 Perhaps
Oregon will become the laboratory in which we test whether such a
balance can be successfully achieved. Professor Jonsen concludes his
article with a plea for vigilance, lest we as a society become too
complacent in our acceptance of physician-assisted death.
In the next article, Professor Giles Scofield sets out to challenge
the ways in which we think and talk about physician-assisted sui-
cide.24 He begins with a critique of rights analysis, which, in Profes-
sor Scofield's view, has led to a destructive societal dynamic in which
individuals stand in the marketplace of ideas and simply hurl compet-
20. Albert R. Jonsen, Physician Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 459 (1995).
21. Id. at 462.
22. Id. at 468.
23. Id. at 467.
24. Giles R. Scofield, Some Myths About Physician-Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
473 (1995).
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ing inviolate rights at each other." He contends that this privileging
of diatribe over discourse threatens our very democratic existence. As
one who has previously lamented the "war mentality" that has
gridlocked the abortion debate,26 I am sympathetic to his call for
civility and mutual respect as we talk with each other about physician-
assisted death.
Professor Scofield moves on to challenge the proposition that those
who support the "right-to-die" must also as a matter of logic support
the "right to physician-assisted suicide."27 In doing so, he questions
the validity of the syllogism that lies at the very core of the current
rationale for physician-assisted death: that assisted death is the logical
next step in the fight for individual autonomy and the right to self-
determination.2" Professor Scofield contends that one cannot derive
the positive right to assisted suicide from the negative right to refuse
medical treatment, and he finds it supremely ironic that the very same
right-to-die movement that has fought to demedicalize death now finds
itself in the position of arguing for the medicalization of death in the
form of assisted suicide.2 9
Professor Scofield deconstructs the debate over physician-assisted
death even further by suggesting that its very existence is symptomatic
of much larger ills within our society. He challenges the morality of
a people who would spend so much time arguing over whether
individuals have the right to assisted death and so little time demand-
ing justice in the form of a health care system that is available to all
and devoted to improving the lives of those who turn to it for care.30
In the end, whether or not one agrees with Professor Scofield's
position, we can surely respect his charge to each of us that we
reexamine our own values as we participate in the discussion about
physician-assisted death.
The next two articles return us to the more traditional rights
analysis that, despite Professor Scofield's reservations, we seem to have
committed ourselves to in the near future. In comparing Ms. Tucker's
legal formulation of the rights involved in cases such as Compassion in
25. Id. at 478.
26. See Annette E. Clark, Abortion and the Pied Piper of Compromise, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
265, 296-300 (1993).
27. Scofield, supra note 24, at 477.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 478.
30. Id. at 488.
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Dying31 with that of Professor Larson's,32 one cannot help but be
struck by the fact that each of them uses the same Supreme Court
cases, Cruzan33 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,34 to justify oppo-
site conclusions on the constitutionality of state statutes that criminal-
ize assisted suicide.3" They are, of course, engaging in the kind of
analysis that those of us in law teaching try so hard to instill in our
students-distinguishing and analogizing Supreme Court precedent in
a way that results in a coherent and cohesive legal framework that
supports their respective positions. Both Ms. Tucker and Professor
Larson recognize that the decision will ultimately turn on the level of
constitutional protection afforded the liberty interest involved. The
Cruzan opinion with its rather narrow view of the liberty interest in
refusing life-sustaining treatment is obviously more helpful to Professor
Larson's position, while Casey and its recognition of a realm of
personal liberty free from government interference provides stronger
support for Ms. Tucker's.
Some months after the Symposium, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals weighed in on the question of whether the United States
Constitution allows a state to criminalize physician-assisted suicide for
competent, terminally-ill individuals. The appellate court, in a 2-1
decision reversing the district court in Compassion in Dying and
upholding Washington's statute, rejected the view that the Constitu-
tion encompasses a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide. 36
In doing so, the majority argued that the Supreme Court's broad
statements in Casey concerning the realm of protected personal liberty
interests must not be extracted from the abortion arena and applied in
this case.3 ' The court focused instead on the long history of criminal
prohibition of assisted suicide in this country, the differences between
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and assisted suicide, and
Washington's strong interest in protecting vulnerable individuals from
31. Kathryn L. Tucker, Physician Aid in Dying: A Constitutional Right, 18 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 495 (1995).
32. Edward J. Larson, Seeking Compassion in Dying: The Washington State Law Against
Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 509 (1995).
33. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
34. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
35. The two federal district courts that have decided this question have also reached opposite
conclusions. While the court in Compassion in Dying held that terminally ill, competent
individuals have a protected liberty interest in committing physician-assisted suicide, a federal
district court in New York rejected the existence of such a protected liberty interest. See Quill
v. Koppel, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), appeal docketed, No. 95-7028 (2d Cir. 1995).
36. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
37. Id. at 590.
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coerced or involuntary assisted death.38 In contrast, Judge Wright,
in dissent, asserted that Washington's statute violates the fundamental
right of terminally-ill, mentally competent adults to choose physician-
assisted suicide to end their lives.39 Now that the Ninth Circuit has
issued its decision, it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court
will take up this question in the near future.
Dr. Peter McGough moves our attention from the constitutional
to the medical realm.4" In exploring the reasons why the issue has
come to the fore in the 1990s, he questions whether assisted death is
a solution that we as a society ought to embrace. In staking out his
position, Dr. McGough asserts that physician-assisted death may
compromise the element of trust that is so necessary to the physician-
patient relationship.41 He further argues that the distinction, recog-
nized by both the medical profession and the law, between allowing a
patient to die from natural causes and intentionally causing an
individual's death is critical to the ethical practice of medicine and to
the protection of patients.42 He concludes his article with an ac-
knowledgment that the medical and other healing professions have an
obligation to improve their care of the dying, and unless and until they
do so, the demand for physician-assisted death will continue.
In the next article, Dr. Thomas Preston provides a direct response
to the traditional arguments advanced by Dr. McGough against
physician involvement in assisted death.43 Dr. Preston deplores the
hypocrisy of the medical profession, which publicly opposes medical
involvement in physician-assisted death and yet privately manages and
hastens its patients' deaths every day in ways that he argues are
morally and philosophically indistinguishable from assisted death."
Dr. Preston asserts that we use language to shape attitudes, and that
by setting up false dichotomies where we distinguish, for example,
between physician actions that allow an individual to die naturally and
those that "kill," we merely delude ourselves about the extent of
physician involvement in the timing and modes of their patients'
deaths.4" He concludes that the medical profession and the larger
38. Id. at 590-94.
39. Id. at 594-97 (Wright, J., dissenting).
40. Peter M. McGough, Medical Concerns About Physician Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 521 (1995).
41. Id. at 525.
42. Id.
43. Thomas Preston, Physician Involvement in Life-Ending Practices, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
531 (1995).
44. Id. at 543-44.
45. Id. at 537.
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society must recognize this involvement and begin to construct a new
moral measure by which to judge physicians' actions in facilitating,
easing, and ending their patients' lives.
In the final article in the Symposium Issue, Dr. Donald Spencer
moves beyond the debate over whether physician-assisted death should
be legalized and envisions a world in which it is legal.46 He asserts
that health care providers, who may be called upon in the very near
future to provide such services, are ill-prepared to do so. He further
contends that the general public has very little understanding of death
and of the alternatives for care available to those with terminal
illnesses, particularly in the realm of hospice and in-home care.47 He
is concerned that individuals' decisions as to assisted death will be
driven by unfounded fears rather than reality. Dr. Spencer provides
a pragmatic and practical perspective in which he emphasizes the need
for education of health care providers and the public. He also
advocates advance planning on the part of health care providers so that
if the day comes, they will have written procedures and standards in
place that will allow for the safe and responsible provision of physi-
cian-assisted death services.4"
III. CONCLUSION
The articles within this Symposium Issue illustrate the deep
historical, medical, professional, legal, ethical, and personal dimensions
of this topic. They are not intended to, and of course could not,
provide definitive answers on the question whether we as a society
should endorse physician-assisted death. Rather, our goal in pursuing
this Symposium was to advance the discussion in an interdisciplinary
setting so that we all might better understand what is at stake in the
debate. And so I commend to you the Symposium Issue.
46. Donald E. Spencer, Practical Implications for Health Care Providers in a Physician-Asisted
Suicide Environment, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 545 (1995).
47. Id. at 546.
48. Id. at 551.
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